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<CN> 5 <CT>CONTEMPORARY OBSESSIONS WITH TIME AND THE PROMISE OF THE

FUTURE. <CA>Simone Abram <A>Contemporary obsessions?
This chapter considers the notions of future that are embedded in the notion of land-use planning, sometimes known as Urban Planning or Town and Country Planning. Since planning as it is practiced in Western Europe would appear to be inherently future-oriented, it offers insights into future-methodologies both as ethnographic objects (planning's futures) and for ethnographic methods themselves (studying planning's futures). Through a discussion of forward planning and planning for housing in England, the chapter highlights the different temporal horizons of the future, the varying notions of human agency in achieving particular futures, whether dangerous or mundane, and the very different means of conceptualizing both a static future of the imagination, and a dynamic trajectory between now and then. While planning futures are sometimes conceptualized as Utopian, the reality of governmental planning is far more mundane and instrumental, with only quite occasional appearances of overblown scenarios or imagined worlds. More commonly, future planning is reduced to a process of applying governmental methodologies based on quite abstract policy imperatives.
This chapter shows how Utopian or Dystopian futures bounce in and out of the mundane practice of governmental planning to show how bureaucratic processes work to reduce broader future concepts to manageable mechanisms.
Land-use planning is an example of future-thinking to have emerged strongly in the twentieth century, in contrast to conventional religious or enlightenment temporalities and most certainly with different temporal horizons. Foucault noted a shift in the concern of governments once the development of statistical techniques enabled them to manage their populations (or at least to imagine that they did), but this can be complemented by the observation that the concern to govern changed in form again from the nineteenth century to the twentieth century. The most notable shift was the increasing attention paid not just to managing the population now, but in controlling its future. The field of town planning thus emerged in its contemporary form in the UK early in the twentieth century on the back of new sciences of hygiene, for example, as well as through the domestication of colonial development practices (Reade, 1987; Porter 2010; cf. Peattie 1970) . The social movements that were to become institutionalized through the Town and Country Planning Association and then formalized in various parliamentary Acts, for example, aimed to improve the conditions of the poor, in the name of progress and humanity, ultimately aiming to replace Christian charity with comprehensive Welfare by means of rights related to land and property. In brief, they were concerned with what Reade refers to as 'the land question ' (1987: 36) , essentially a question of class. Land-use planning gradually evolved into a concern with the 'balanced' distribution of economic activity, followed by attempts to promote material equality after the Second World War, before it morphed into a primarily technical bureaucratic operation to maximize resource use, presaging a bouncing back and forth between government-directed social improvement versus investor/market-led development.
Gradually, through the twentieth century, a stronger imperative to instigate increasingly comprehensive state forward-planning emerged (Murdoch and Abram 2002) .
Despite a declared political adherence among many Western governments to 'free' markets, the practice of demanding long-term future plans from regional and local government bodies continues. At the central governmental level, the motivation for planning is often rhetorically linked to grand, global or existential issues: the need to tackle issues that cannot be accommodated in the market, by individuals or isolated groups such as climate change, environmental pollution, or civilizational aims. The motivation to plan thus relies on both apocalyptic and utopian ambitions, but as it moves into practice, the invocation of threatening or inspiring scenarios becomes more marginal, appearing more often as a framing comment or reference.
<A>Materially planned futures
In the UK, the state requires all local authorities (municipalities) to produce regular forward plans that are used as guidelines for decisions on particular development applications made by external parties in the planning period. This reflects a split in planning practice between future-oriented policies and the detailed regulation of particular acts of development. The scope of forward plans has varied over time, but such plans generally sets out directions of future development, from the broad brush (an aim to be sustainable) to the specific (x number of units of development in y location). The four-to-five year planning period is usually considered in relation to a future-horizon of up to two decades, so a more distant future is the premise for more concrete near-future policies. Each plan is ostensibly public, and is put in the public domain for comments and objections before it is authorized. This is pragmatic, in the sense that planning is about externalities -ensuring that development does not impinge on neighbouring property (or the rights of its owner), but also hard won through post-war campaigns for citizen-participation. Although the planning system does categorize development actors into proposers and objectors of specific policies, in practice objectors often have alternative suggestions as well as different approaches to articulating priorities for the future. Anthropologists have long taken for granted that the objects of their interest are the subjects of regimes, and it makes sense to see that governmental urban or land-use planning are means by which the state attempts to govern populations, and through which contests over who controls land and resources are played out. I use the term 'played out', since 'resistance' and its corollary, 'force' offer a crude dualistic model for the multi-party struggles over loosely specified aims in varying contexts. While the focus in studies of resistance is largely on the issues at stake and how various actors organize to attempt to control them (or resist their control), anthropologists are now paying more attention to the subtle ways by which the future is presented materially in the everyday (Pink and Lewis offer a discussion in terms of resilience: 2014). The future is not only invoked in the grand debates about future plans noted above, but future urban plans have quiet ways of making themselves present.
Since the post-war period, British planning has also required local authorities to make public announcements of all applications by landowners for permission to embark on development activities (known as 'planning permission'). Questions over particular, concrete futures have found their way into material forms in largely obfuscatory, if public, ways. Lists of current applications usually appear in small print in the adverts section of the local press (which in Britain is largely the vehicle for reporting local crime and planning issues). Sheets of formally coded, tightly printed A4 text also appear in the location of a site that is the subject of planning permission, often nailed to nearby lamp-posts, or sometimes taped to trees. The use of visual methods to observe the materialization of the future in the present reveals broader, if equally taken for granted, visual indications of future plans. Hoardings are often a precursor to the transformation of a building site, for example, either anonymously shielding secret activities, or flamboyantly advertising a future utopia, complete with the name of its sponsor.
i Thus the signs of future construction activities are displayed in the present through various visual means other than the actual activities of building (see Figure   5 .1). Our ability to interpret these signs depends on our familiarity with contextual information about building regulations, planning permission, tax exemptions or other institutional conditions. All is not always as it seems, however, since the promise of completion may be elusive. Such observations might suggest that futures have only a rhetorical (including visual) role in planning practice. But planning practice refers to a broad range of activities, from urban design to abstract policy development. While one might imagine that a plan is a kind of 'blueprint' , a detailed site-specific design for something to be constructed, British plans are more like policy papers including general principles and some general site-identification. In this they are quite different from the development plans found in other European countries.
Norwegian plans, for example, often contain detailed holistic mapped-guides to development, tying in provision of schools, medical centres, sports grounds, shops and other facilities related to new housing development. Swedish housing development plans include design principles and rules on the number of metres between housing and children's play areas.
British plans contain no design guidance, outside broad designations such as conservation areas or areas of 'outstanding natural beauty'.
These forward policy plans, while interesting documents in themselves, are only a small part of the planning process. Rather like the dry minimal minutes of long, crowded, contentious meeting, they reflect little of on-going practices of revision, negotiation, political competition and public contest. The many, differently conceptualized futures that are elaborated and debated during the process of planning are often quite invisible in the plan document itself, and the plan is later invoked rarely, perhaps only referred to as one factor to be considered when applications to develop a particular site are debated in council planning committees. Even so, the plan -either the document or the idea of a plan existing -operates as a kind of promise that requires validation, and promises, as Austin recognized, may live for a long while without being fulfilled, as long as their fulfilment can be imagined (Abram and Weszkalnys 2013) . Even a municipal housing plan promises something. Whether it is hope or fear, it is a statement about the future that must have some credible chance of becoming, if it is to maintain its status as a policy. Whether promises made into the plan then begin to become apparent in the hoardings and notices on boards by building sites becomes a measure of felicity that could (although it very rarely is) become a measure of governmental credibility once its imagined future becomes the present or past. people, in-depth interviews with a cross-section of these objectors (from citizens to landowners and statutory authorities) and with officials, attendance at public examinations of the policies, council meetings, protest actions, and participant observation in one designated development site over six months. Taking the plan as the focus of the ethnographic enquiry, rather than a particular location, our research was more non-sited rather than multi-sited (Abram 2001a ), although we also pursued a kind of nested geographical focusing. So while our research activities took us all over the southeast of England, we focused in first on the county of Buckinghamshire (north west of London), within that the district of Aylesbury
Vale, and within that, the settlement of Haddenham. By 'following the plan' and its various policies, we were able to use principles from ANT to trace the links and relations between actors and actants, and to use ethnographic methods to dig below the policies and institutions and understand how each element was interpreted by the actors involved. Since planning disputes are often about the broader implications of policy and the significance for different participants of the plans proposed (including elements of landscape-nationalism), each party often adopts stereotyping language about their opponents. To get beyond the performative conflictual language of 'nimbyism' or 'selfish capitalists', and the manipulative PR strategies of the professional participants, we needed to understand the human actors are rounded social beings. In-depth extensive ethnographic methods were the means to achieve these aims.
It was swiftly clear that little of the planning perspective from the district council planning office was shared by local residents, while house builders approached the planning system through game-playing with the ultimate and over-riding concern of maximizing profit and 'shareholder value'. Much of the debate around the plan concerned housing numbers (see Abram 2001b ). In the large village where I did most of my participant-observation, many residents recognized that houses in the village were far too expensive for young or lowerearning people, but that additional housing numbers identified in the plan would not ensure that smaller, cheaper housing would be constructed. The village's history is documented back to Saxon times; it was a key location in the English civil war, and one of the first English villages to buy itself out of servitude to the church. A village of land-owning farmers (or 'yeomen'), it had held an annual market for centuries, and had declined only during the general urbanization of the twentieth century, particularly post-Second World War. A new estate of 400 houses built in the 1970s in a village of then around 2,000 people had been a great upheaval, and villagers described how it had taken many years before the 'old' village had adapted to the new arrivals. Expanding village activities and traditions to accommodate new residents was demanding and was felt to have endangered village social life for some time. Continued expansion changed the nature of the village, from an intensely social location to a commuter dormitory. Escalating prices also meant that 'our children' were forced to move away, a doubly difficult problem for low-earning young families who were forced to move away from the free childcare and support that grandparents provide. Most villagers were keen that smaller and cheaper homes should be made available for village families, but as illustrated above, this is not catered for in the planning system. So, while villagers would say that they welcomed affordable homes, they could not see any justification for more highly priced 'executive housing', and objected most strongly to the proposed plans. In contrast, the future-vision of the planners, shared at least partly by members of the planning committees at regional and to some extent local level centred on the question of where to house future generations. These imagined future generations were not imagined as kin or offspring of current actual residents, but as a general demographic proportion of the national future population who deserved good housing as well as anyone. Their future vision was also framed around an environmental concern with climate change and a need to reduce pollution and energy consumption. This concern was channelled through criteria-based evaluations such as national policies on ideal features of sustainable settlements, including the magical 10,000 population figure of government guidance, and the possibility of reducing people's 'need to travel' by providing housing and employment sites in the same settlement, and expanding those settlements with connections to public transport.
For the planning authorities, this history of increased housing -the building of several large housing estates around the original village -became not a reason for some other village to take its turn to increase its housing stock, but a trend that justified further expansion. In DCLG's terms, sustainable housing should be located where there was access to work and transport, and a population of 10,000 was considered sufficient to justify investment in public transport infrastructure. Based on its proximity to railway connections (a commuter service taking around an hour to London) and the presence of manufacturing industry (paper This discussion about housing futures illustrates important aspects of forward planning. Forward planning is like consulting oracles in that it is less about desired and feared future than about commenting on the world as it is today, and how we would prefer that it was. It is unlike consulting oracles in the manner of its practice, being embedded in statistical methodologies, demography and cartography, the inaccuracies of the data quietly understated. Increased attempts to involve citizens in planning debates since the 1990s have stumbled at exactly this point, since house builders urging the need for new housing have been largely out of step with local concerns about how the world should be. While house builders and government have been obsessing over housing numbers -just as James Scott indicates -local actors have systematically understood that local decisions are largely predetermined in a hierarchical system. As they learned in practice, objections to a local plan weighed little when the identification of a location for housing had been already secured in a regional plan. To challenge the local decision, they must have challenged the regional decision and been involved in making objections and representations to the regional planning enquiry for the strategic plan. And so on up the system and down again. In other words, to challenge a local plan effectively, you must have already been engaged in challenging plans for around five years at least, to secure the conditions for your local challenge to be successful. In other words, you require a vision of future potential plans many years in advance if you are to be in a position to amend plans for local futures.
ii <A>What is planning about?
Futures in planning practice take varied forms. Visions of the future becomes figures around which to articulate hopes and fears for collective life, for ideals about nature and culture, about spiritual beliefs and moral standpoints. In the village mentioned above, a great deal of energy was expended by villagers on the reconstruction of the village pond, complete with pumps and water filters, to ensure that it matched the chocolate-box image that made it such an ideal location for filming popular TV series, and gave the village the veneer of being 'archaic' and timeless. The village green was constantly in the process of being perfected to match an idealized image of Englishness that it had probably never previously inhabited. This archaic timelessness was thus the object of future concern, a concern that the future should time, a consistent criticism of planning futures is that they are inadequately informed by the past. Villagers who were not familiar with planning process were aghast at the lack of prior research before proposals were circulated. No concept of the vernacular history of the village was present in the plan's policies, with the village's entire, contested, radical and archaic history obscured by projected trends in house-building completions. As mentioned above, while villagers saw the previous housing expansions as a trial they had survived, planners saw them as a precedent (an argument that was rehearsed throughout the planning process).
From the village perspective, planning's future had no history, invalidating its imagination of the future. So now the future of planning looks rather different: less an open debate about future ideals -be they utopian (ambivalent) or rationalistic -and more a battle over the here and now, and between different continuities. Through proposed plans, a distant and potentially disruptive future came crashing into the lives of villagers, dedicated as so many of them were, to the continuity of the present.
<A>What does anthropology tell us about planning?
Anthropological analysis of the future offers a means to disaggregate the ways that the future is of concern to different people at different times, in different ways, and enables us to see Harding insist, the future in the modern West 'is not the empty category that it is supposed to be ' (2005, 8) . On the contrary, they argue that the conflict of futures past and present is central to modern temporality, and that this is a paradox of modern dispositions toward the These contested futures far from the kinds of imaginative future that fuels the hope that has captivated some anthropologists (Crapanzano 2004 , Miyazaki 2004 , Josephides 2014 , although its corollary, despair, is never far away. Such work begs the question of how we can account for the work of imagination that the future demands. Josephides argues that the sense of possibility in hopes about the future are existential, with hope oriented towards a future that is different from the past, and anthropological interest being in the ways in which people desire that future and act on their desires. In other words, to hope is to imagine a future, while to imagine is to think in the present, whether that is about the future or the past.
To imagine is thus existential in that it is an act of being human and eliciting meaning.
Imagining the future can thus be conceptualized as a way of thinking out what it is to be oneself, by expanding one's horizon beyond oneself. Planning futures, on the other hand, are supposed not to be about the self, but must be about the grounded and socio-political imagination of the progression from now to a bounded reality to come, yet its means of imagination corresponds to Josephides' existential practice. It is worth noting that such existential imagination is also neither linear nor consistent: changes can be traced in the concepts of future that emerge in planning over time. In the Norwegian context, for example, Vike finds striking changes in the character of the future since World War II (2013). In the post-war period, the welfare state was a future object, for which sacrifices could be made now in the journey towards a utopian future. But in the current welfare state, citizens expect satisfaction now -the welfare state is understood to be in a contemporary future, in which its imperfections are understood as fatal flaws in the present, not obstacles on the way to an ideal future.
If thinking about the future -or imagining a future -is a means of thinking through existence, then Guyer's critique of the changing horizon of the future can be understood as a broad critique of contemporary life. Guyer describes an unease with contemporary present in what she calls 'a strange evacuation of the temporal frame of the "near future" … of the process of implicating oneself in the ongoing life of the social and material world that used to be encompassed under an expansively inclusive concept of "reasoning" ' (2007: 409) . Her argument is directed towards changing economic policy, and in particular the combination in monetarist and neo-liberal economics of a prophetic vision of a distant future in which market values work themselves out to perfection, with an immediate future of action in which money supply is regulated in order to achieve that distant goal of prices determined by supply and demand. For Guyer, this long-term (the long-term in which Keynes noted that 'we are all dead') has a parallel in messianic prophecy of evangelical Christianity. Life is divided between the present and the end-times; the present as a hiatus between two eternities, thus removing history and reason and evacuating the space of medium-term action. Her concept of temporal horizons is particularly useful in contrasting the scales of future that are argued through planning, with its immediate, near, medium and distant timescales.
In summarizing where the analysis of planning futures takes us, we may usefully add to the list of statements that Wallman compiled, which offer a valuable starting point for conceptualizing the significance of the future in contemporary rhetoric and practice:
vi <EXT>  That the future can be used to justify present action -a forward-looking version of mythical charter.
 Scenarios of the future function to illuminate the present and/or to offer at-adistance and so politically (and emotionally?) safe ways of criticising it.
 Belief in the future underpins the sense of self and its survival.
 Changes in those beliefs, however generated, can work radically to alter the way individuals and groups relate to each other, to the natural environment, and to culture itself." (Ibid.: 16)
To these we might add that the future can be put to work in the service of a promise, in the context of a correct set of ritual and social circumstances such that the future does not merely hold out promise, but is implicated in the act of promising. Such promises may be politically effective or infelicitous. We do not necessarily know that the promise is infelicitous until the promised outcome is not fulfilled, by which time the promise may have served its purpose.
One further capacity that the future has is thus to defer dilemmas that are irreconcilable, to structure difficulties and to respond to dissonance. We know that our lives today are initiating consequences that can be catastrophic in the future. We know that driving cars or burning gas contributes to climate change, yet for most people it is impossible to continue with their established life without these things happening. The collective -and certainly the political -response, not surprisingly, is to shunt them forward, to make promises about how we may act in the future; promises that may or may not be infelicitous, or more or less convincing.
State planning is also imagined as a mechanism to compensate for the inability of citizens otherwise to address large, overarching or structural challenges of the kind generated by state modernism itself (hence the resort to idealized settlement sizes for sustainability).
The archetypal Western Modernist abstract notion of "The Future" is dependent on a unilinear view of time and optimism, with an underlying sense of progression toward something better. Enlightenment visions of progress required an optimistic future to counter a puritan day of doom in which earth and humanity would inevitably be destroyed. Ironically, astronomy tells us that this will come, but given that the timescale of its coming is on such a different plane to our own sense of lifetime and time passing, it remains possible to remove it in some way from everyday consciousness (cf. Guyer 2007) . It is another form of the death that we all know is coming, that is part of life, and that largely fails to dampen human enthusiasm for that life. The future offers life and death, and this is one of its paradoxes: not resolved but suspended because of the incompatibility of the ideas and the uncertainty of their timings. As Guyer has pointed out, the horizons of the future are shifting, but they still
